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of the crimes, the original headline sentence was considered “unduly lenient”.36 As
can be seen from these two cases, the court will only exercise its power in exceptional
circumstances and this makes its existence far less problematic.
C. CONCLUSION
The Scottish appellate court’s ability to increase the sentence of an offender ex
proprio motu raises important questions of fairness. The contention that the power
may dissuade an offender with arguable grounds of appeal from challenging his or
her sentence is, however, questionable: a prospective appellant is less likely to be
deterred in the knowledge of the high standard of review adopted by the courts, as
further clarified by Murray. Claims of unfairness in terms of comparative justice are
outweighed by public interest considerations in seeing the court respond to unduly
lenient sentences when it has the chance to do so, be it to protect the public from
potentially dangerous offenders or to affirm public confidence in the criminal justice
system. And in the absence of persuasive arguments as to why a Crown appeal against
sentence should be the only instance whereby an unduly lenient sentence can be
remedied, the court’s ex proprio motu power remains legitimate.
Alasdair Shaw
University of Glasgow
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The Transmission of Liability for Exposure to
Asbestos: Bavaird v Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd in the
Inner House
The Inner House of the Court of Session has given its judgment in the case of Bavaird
v Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd and others,1 and has held that liability for the exposure
to asbestos of a council worker, and his subsequent death from mesothelioma, by
the now defunct East Kilbride Development Corporation (EKDC) passed to its
successor, South Lanarkshire Council (SLC). In so holding it overturned the decision
at first instance that liability did not transmit. The result is good news for employees
of statutory bodies, like local authorities, who are negligently exposed to asbestos but
who do not go on to develop symptoms of disease, as is common, for many years
afterwards: the Inner House’s decision means that their right to claim damages will
36 Para 27.
1 [2013] CSIH 98.
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be exercisable against any statutory successor of the body which exposed them to the
danger.
A. BAVAIRD AT FIRST INSTANCE
I have argued elsewhere2 that the decision at first instance was an unfortunate one.
It seemed perverse that someone’s right to claim damages for an asbestos-related
injury should be dependent upon whether or not his employer was still in existence
(in which case recovery would be undoubted), or whether its rights and liabilities
had been taken over by a successor (in which case, according to the first instance
judgment, there would be no transmission of liability). Holding that liabilities do
not transmit to successor authorities thwarts the underlying purpose of the very
legislation (the “transfer order”) transferring rights and liabilities in such cases, and
it is therefore heartening to see a purposive approach to interpreting such legislation
being approved of in both of the substantive judgments in the Inner House (those of
Lady Paton and Lord Drummond Young).
The outcome at first instance was reached on a judicial assessment of the transfer
order as not applying to contingent liability which had not yet matured at the date
of the transfer into actual liability to pay compensation to injured parties, and which,
looked at on that date, might never so mature. This meant that those who had been
exposed negligently to asbestos (this constituting the injuria element of a delict) but
who did not begin to manifest any ill effects of the exposure (the damnum element
of a delict) until after the transfer of liabilities to the successor body were unable to
claim. The judge at first instance held that no “liability” (the term used in the relevant
legislative provision) to compensate such people had existed when EKDC ceased to
exist, nor indeed could there even be said to be a “contingent liability” in existence
at the time, as for a liability or an obligation to be “contingent” there had first to
be some obligation in existence, and a delictual obligation required the presence of
both injuria and damnum before it could be said to exist. In my earlier comments
(referred to above), I criticised this approach, both as misunderstanding the point
that liabilities can be contingent in a sense other than that described by the judge at
first instance, but also because such an interpretative approach thwarted the purpose
of the legislative provisions.
B. BAVAIRD ON APPEAL
On appeal, Lady Paton, in the leading judgment, made two important arguments
justifying the decision to overturn the judgment at first instance:
(1) Construing the order as a whole, and adopting a purposive construction,
it was clear that the word “liabilities” in article 2 of the transfer order
included “contingent liabilities and potential liabilities”, such as liabilities
which emerged after the date of transfer (these including liabilities to pay
damages which arose only on the manifestation of physical symptoms); and
2 M Hogg, “Liabilities and obligations: two different concepts?” (2013) J of Professional Negligence 186.
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(2) Quite apart from article 2, there was a further provision of the order (article
3) stating that “anything done” before the date of transfer by EKDC “for the
purposes of or in connection with the property, rights and liabilities transferred
by article 2” was, after the date of transfer, to be treated as having been done
by SLC. This meant that the exposure of the deceased employee to asbestos
by EKDC was to be treated as something done by SLC, so that in effect both
the injuria and the damnum in the case were to be imputed to EKDC.
The purposive approach adopted in this first argument is to be approved of, as is the
result reached, but two aspects of Lady Paton’s approach are worth exploring further:
(a) what is the difference, if any, between “contingent liabilities” and “potential
liabilities”?; and
(b) was article 3 supportive of the conclusion reached by the court?
These issues are considered in turn.
C. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE, IF ANY, BETWEEN “CONTINGENT
LIABILITIES” AND “POTENTIAL LIABILITIES”?
The appearance of the idea of a “potential liability”, and the suggestion that it may be
something different to a “contingent liability”, was a development in the Inner House.
At first instance there was reference only to “contingent” liability. The change in
terminology may reflect usage of the phrase “potential liability” in the recent Supreme
Court case of In Re Nortel Group of Companies3 (though this case is not mentioned
in the judgments of the Inner House) and in previous English cases concerning
the transfer of statutory liabilities (such as Walters v Babergh DC4), but if that is
so it would seem odd to suggest that potential and contingent liability might mean
something different, as the judgments in these previous cases switch between the
language of potential and contingent without seeming to suggest any difference in
meaning.5
So do the two terms indicate different concepts? The fact that Lady Paton
appeared to distinguish the two suggests that she thought so:
The pursuers’ argument had changed and developed since the debate in the Outer House.
In the Outer House, the pursuers periled their case on contingent liability, whereas in
the Inner House they relied primarily upon the concept of potential liability, failing which
contingent liability.6
3 [2013] UKSC 52.
4 (1983) 82 LGR 234.
5 So, for instance, a portion of Lord Neuburger’s judgment in In Re Nortel is entitled “Does the potential
liability fall within Rule 13.12(1)(b)?”, that statutory insolvency rule narrating that it encompasses both
“certain” and “contingent” liabilities (emphases added).
6 Para 36.
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This remark suggests that counsel also clearly thought that contingent and potential
liabilities were different. Frustratingly, what the difference might be between the two
is not explained.
One suspects that, because of the strong judicial view expressed at first instance
that, for a contingent liability to exist, there must be a completed obligation (i.e.
injuria plus damnum) to begin with, the reclaimer’s counsel in the case were wary
of using the idea of contingent liability again on appeal. I believe (as noted aearlier)
that the view taken at first instance was a mistake, and there is authority to suggest
that an obligation (/liability) may be contingent in the sense of either an obligation
which has been formed, but under which performance will only become due in the
event of some uncertain future event (contracts may be contingent in this sense), or
an obligation which has not yet been formed but which might be, i.e. one whose very
existence is contingent upon an uncertain future event (contract and delict can both
be contingent in this sense). Be that as it may, if the tactic to use “potential liability”
was adopted in order to avoid first instance disapproval of “contingent liability”, then
what perhaps may have been meant by “potential liability” is something which is
not yet a completed obligation, i.e. (in a delictual context) it is just the presence of
injuria without damnum, thus a state of affairs which has the “potential” to become a
completed obligation but only on the occurrence of damnum. If that was the intended
meaning, however, it would be inconsistent with the apparent synonymous use of
“potential” and “contingent” liability in previous cases such as In Re Nortel.7
Judicial exposition in the Inner House of the meanings intended in the use of these
two different terms would have been of great assistance.
D. WAS ARTICLE 3 SUPPORTIVE OF THE CONCLUSION REACHED?
As to this second part of Lady Paton’s justification for overturning the decision at
first instance, there are perhaps some doubts that this was relevant to the question
at hand. Her Ladyship says that article 3 of the transfer order had the effect that the
“negligent exposure to asbestos” of the deceased, which occurred during the existence
of EKDC, was “something done . . . by, or on behalf of, or in relation to, EKDC for
the purposes of its property, rights and liabilities”, and hence to be imputed to SLC
under article 3.8 The concern is that this is arguably stretching the semantics of the
phrase “something done” beyond the purpose the phrase was employed to serve.
How were EKDC, in exposing an employee to asbestos, “doing something” for the
purposes of, or in connection with, their property, rights or liabilities? Lady Paton, in
describing the effect of article 3, gives the example of “general maintenance work on
housing stock, including roof repairs” as being something done for such purposes, and
one can see why this example makes sense: repairing the roofs of a council’s housing
stock is something done to maintain its property and thus preserve the value of an
7 In one Canadian judgment, however, contingent liability was distinguished from the “potential for
liability”, the latter being considered to be the mere possibility that liability might arise: see West Bay
SonShip Yachts Ltd v Esau 2009 BCCR 31.
8 Para 30.
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existing right of ownership in the property. Similarly, an example of something done to
preserve a claim in contract might be a notification to a debtor that EKDC considered
a contractual debt as still outstanding – such a notification would reset the prescriptive
clock, and thus preserve its right to enforce the contractual debt (the same might be
said of a right to claim damages in delict from a party which had negligently damaged
council property). Such an act would quite properly be classed as something done
“for the purposes of or in connection with” a contractual (or delictual) right (in a
claim sense), given that it would preserve the very existence of the claim. Similarly,
the act of EKDC in tendering payment under a debt owed by it, or of entering a
defence in an action raised against it, would be something done “for the purposes
of or in connection with” a liability, and would properly fall, under article 3, to be
considered as having been done by its successor authority.
But negligently exposing a person to asbestos is not done for “the purposes of”
a right or liability, as it is neither done purposely nor, until the exposure occurs,
is there any liability; on the contrary, it is something which creates the liability in
the first place. Exposure to asbestos could only be done for the “purposes of or in
connection with” the liability ensuing if (perversely) it was done with the intention
that the council, in exposing the employee to asbestos, would be creating such liability
(a fanciful scenario).
It might be countered that this argument adopts too strict an interpretation of
the phrase “for the purpose of or in connection with”, but it is suggested that the
application of this provision in relation to negligent (i.e. non-purposeful) exposure to
a harmful agent is stretching the meaning of the phrase too far, especially given the
context of the article in which it appears, an article designed (so it appears) to ensure
that actions taken in relation to existing property, rights and liabilities of the dissolved
entity are to be deemed to be actions of its successor.
It should be added, however, that these doubts relating to the article 3 point do
not undermine the decision of the Inner House: the result reached is perfectly able to
stand by reference simply to the interpretation adopted of the meaning of “liabilities”
as used in article 2.
E. CONCLUSION
Neither of the above two observations on aspects of the generally commendable
judgment of Lady Paton in any way undermines the welcome good sense which the
decision of the Inner House brings. Had the decision gone the other way, there
would doubtless have been mounting pressure for a legislative change to ensure
that the unjust deprivation of delictual claims in cases of this sort was rectified. It
is understood that the Inner House’s decision may be being appealed to the Supreme
Court. If so, it is to be hoped that the outcome provided for by the Inner House is
preserved.
Martin Hogg
University of Edinburgh
